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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4906 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4906 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/4906 archive 351 disk0/00/00/70/10 2016-01-15 02:15:42 2021-08-27 17:18:16 2016-01-15 02:15:42 monograph show 3 Hofbauer J. 1385 Sigmund K. 1050 pub iis_ecl prog_adn Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of the deterministic dynamical systems motivated by evolutionary game theory, including ordinary differential equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reaction-diffusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called 'folk theorem of evolutionary game theory') is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the long-term behavior of players adjusting their behavior to maximize their payoff. 2003-12 published IR-03-078 IR-03-078 1324 282 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 50 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book