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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/720 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/720 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/720 archive 351 disk0/00/00/07/02 2016-01-15 01:44:02 2021-08-27 17:08:34 2016-01-15 01:44:02 monograph show 2 Young H.P. AL1397 pub iis_met iis_mod prog_sds Two models are developed of the relative power of voters in a voting body, both based on the idea of lobbyists or interest groups creating a "market" for votes. In the first model, a single lobbyist attempts to put together a winning coalition at least cost, and the voters play an n-person game among themselves to determine who will be part of this coalition. Equilibrium prices for the voters result (unless there is a "veto player"); in fact, a novel and particularly strong equilibrium concept for the solution of this class of games obtains. The expected payoffs to the voters constitute one way of measuring their relative power, and the results are compared with traditional measures like the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index. In the second model, two lobbyists are imagined to be in competition for votes. A 2-person game results, and the expected payoffs to the voters (if an equilibrium exists) can be said to constitute a measure of power in a competitive environment. Explicit solutions to the model are obtained when the opposing lobbyists are unevenly matched in terms of resources, and the results are applied to such diverse problems as Presidential campaigning for the U.S. Electoral College and the setting of legislators' salaries. 1977-06 published RR-77-013 RR-77-013 10 2539 public research_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 35 TRUE FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book