7421 16 5050 2 12471 document 5050 IR-04-025.pdf application/pdf 408c70d6981a686bd1e1ad254bb9f2fc MD5 176347 2016-01-15 02:17:16 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/1/IR-04-025.pdf 7421 1 1 text en public
IR-04-025.pdf
15 5767 1 13768 document 5767 indexcodes.txt text/x-c++ 6cb40faf8b120cb182091704dfe65a97 MD5 5273 2016-01-15 02:48:24 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/2/indexcodes.txt 7421 2 2 text/x-c++ other Generate index codes conversion from text to indexcodes en public
indexcodes.txt
http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 5768 2 13769 document 5768 lightbox.jpg image/png 6e64ed4f5ba768f42d5cb8943020a165 MD5 15443 2016-01-15 02:48:26 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/3/lightbox.jpg 7421 3 3 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public
lightbox.jpg
http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/islightboxThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 5769 2 13770 document 5769 preview.jpg image/png 9e627e42872da7312124972982942d59 MD5 6877 2016-01-15 02:48:26 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/4/preview.jpg 7421 4 4 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_preview en public
preview.jpg
http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/ispreviewThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 5770 2 13771 document 5770 medium.jpg image/png 62b1aafec71fe5b91a7ba3e550004f3b MD5 2641 2016-01-15 02:48:27 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/5/medium.jpg 7421 5 5 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_medium en public
medium.jpg
http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/ismediumThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 5771 2 13772 document 5771 small.jpg image/png 16cfbe91289f02af99cb2dd3b57883cf MD5 1021 2016-01-15 02:48:27 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/6/small.jpg 7421 6 6 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_small en public
small.jpg
http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/issmallThumbnailVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 71942 2 199195 document 71942 IR-04-025.pdf application/pdf 7091eca9fedc59414748f9ccebc2111e MD5 285736 2016-10-24 01:53:42 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7421/7/IR-04-025.pdf 7421 7 7 application/pdf other Coversheet Pages conversion from text to application/pdf en public
IR-04-025.pdf
http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 http://eprints.org/relation/isCoversheetVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/5050 archive 351 disk0/00/00/74/21 2016-01-15 02:17:16 2021-08-27 17:18:50 2016-01-15 02:17:16 monograph show 2 Brykalov S.A. Golovina O.N. 7884 Kryazhimskiy A.V. 1514 Competition of Gas Pipeline Projects: A Multi-Player Game of Timing pub iis_ecn iis_mod prog_dyn We use game theory to construct a model of investment in gas pipeline projects competing for a regional gas market. The model is designed as a multi-player game with integral payoffs, in which times of entering the market act as players' strategies. For each player, we identify the location of player's best responses to strategies chosen by other players. On this basis, we reduce the original game to a game with a finite number of strategies for each player. We introduce a regularity condition and for a regular game of timing prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. An application of this result to a symmetric game of timing allows us to give the entire description of the set of all Nash equilibrium points. Finally, we construct a finite algorithm for finding player's best responses and the Nash equilibrium points in the game. The presented approach can be used to analyze competition of large-scale technological and energy transportation projects in situations where the investment periods of sales and the appearance of every new supplier on the market drastically effects the market price. 2004-05 published IR-04-025 IR-04-025 1292 1393 public interim_report IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 17 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/book