Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games

8873 10 61330 3 168782 document 61330 Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games.pdf application/pdf 30d7659c6d3c8b3d8d8b2ce6b247aaba MD5 439517 2016-06-09 11:44:25 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8873/1/Exploration%20dynamics%20in%20evolutionary%20games.pdf 8873 1 1 application/pdf text en public cc_by_nc

Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games.pdf

published 61331 2 168785 document 61331 lightbox.jpg image/png 0939684e0126933a7bbc42cbece49259 MD5 77473 2016-06-09 11:44:47 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8873/2/lightbox.jpg 8873 2 2 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/61330 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/61330 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/61330 archive 351 disk0/00/00/88/73 2016-01-15 08:42:10 2021-08-27 17:20:43 2016-01-15 08:42:10 article show 1 Traulsen A. Hauert C. De Silva H. AL0084 Nowak M.A. 7540 Sigmund K. 1050 Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games pub iis_ecl prog_eep Cooperation; Costly punishment; Finite populations; Mutation rates Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration of the available set of strategies has received less attention so far. In genetic settings, the latter corresponds to mutations in the DNA, whereas in cultural evolution, it describes individuals experimenting with new behaviors. Genetic mutations typically occur with very small probabilities, but random exploration of available strategies in behavioral experiments is common. We term this phenomenon "exploration dynamics" to contrast it with the traditional focus on imitation. As an illustrative example of the emerging evolutionary dynamics, we consider a public goods game with cooperators and defectors and add punishers and the option to abstain from the enterprise in further scenarios. For small mutation rates, cooperation (and punishment) is possible only if interactions are voluntary, whereas moderate mutation rates can lead to high levels of cooperation even in compulsory public goods games. This phenomenon is investigated through numerical simulations and analytical approximations. 2009-01 published National Academy of Sciences 10.1073/pnas.0808450106 XJ-09-031 PNAS; 106(3):709-712 (20 January 2009) [doi:10.1073/pnas.0808450106] 1827 1481 282 public Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 3 709-712 TRUE 1091-6490 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/article