The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

9984 13 61564 3 169234 document 61564 The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.pdf application/pdf a20ed0542c014598a4c3481676b7717a MD5 517956 2016-06-09 14:41:36 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9984/1/The%20take-it-or-leave-it%20option%20allows%20small%20penalties%20to%20overcome%20social%20dilemmas.pdf 9984 1 1 application/pdf text en public cc_by_nc

The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.pdf

published 61565 2 169237 document 61565 lightbox.jpg image/png e150b803e2eb86f5a3d1cf2e2680dcee MD5 75558 2016-06-09 14:41:42 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9984/2/lightbox.jpg 9984 2 2 image/png other Thumbnails conversion from text to thumbnail_lightbox en public

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http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/61564 http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/61564 http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/document/61564 archive 351 disk0/00/00/99/84 2016-01-15 08:46:49 2021-08-27 17:22:31 2016-01-15 08:46:49 article show 1 Sasaki T. AL0345 0000-0002-4635-1389 Brännström Å. 8085 Dieckmann U. 1668 0000-0001-7089-0393 Sigmund K. 1050 The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas pub iis_ecl prog_eep prog_pds Punishment; Rewards; Public goods; Social contact; Evolutionary games Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a "lighter touch" than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost. 2012-01 published National Academy of Sciences 10.1073/pnas.1115219109 XJ-12-059 PNAS; 109(4):1165-1169 (24 January 2012) (Published online 9 January 2012) [doi:10.1073/pnas.1115219109] 2355 39 66 282 public Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 4 1165-1169 TRUE 1091-6490 FALSE info:eu-repo/semantics/article