Items where IIASA Author is "Sasaki, Tatsuya"

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 & Okada, I. (2015). Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game. Biosystems 131, 51-59. 10.1016/j.biosystems.2015.04.002.

Chen, X., Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389, Brännström, Å. & Dieckmann, U. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7089-0393 (2015). First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. Interface 12 (102), p. 20140935. 10.1098/rsif.2014.0935.

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 (2014). The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation. Dynamic Games and Applications 4 (3), 345-362. 10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7.

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 & Uchida, S. (2014). Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Biology Letters 10 (1), p. 20130903. 10.1098/rsbl.2013.0903.

Uchida, S. & Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 (2013). Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.08.006.

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 & Uchida, S. (2013). The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280 (1752) 10.1098/rspb.2012.2498.

Uchida, S. & Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 (2013). Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-071

Chen, X., Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389, Brännström, Å. & Dieckmann, U. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7089-0393 (2013). First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-026

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 & Uchida, S. (2013). Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-065

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 (2013). The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optimal participation. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-064

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389, Brännström, Å., Dieckmann, U. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7089-0393 & Sigmund, K. (2012). The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (4), 1165-1169. 10.1073/pnas.1115219109.

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389, Chen, X., Brännström, Å. & Dieckmann, U. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7089-0393 (2012). How ‘first carrot, then stick’ incentives promote cooperation. In: Worlds Within Reach: From Science To Policy - IIASA 40th Anniversary Conference, 24-26 October 2012, Hofburg Congress Center, Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389, Brännström, Å., Dieckmann, U. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7089-0393 & Sigmund, K. (2012). The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome socila dilemmas. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-12-068

Sasaki, T. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4635-1389 & Unemi, T. (2011). Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 109-114. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.026.