Social selection of game organizers promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games

Liu Y, Chen X, Zhang L, Tao F, & Wang L (2013). Social selection of game organizers promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games. EPL 102 (5) DOI:10.1209/0295-5075/102/50006.

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Abstract

Inspired by the fact that opportunities in reality are heterogeneous for individuals due to social selection, we propose an evolutionary public goods game model considering the social selection of game organizers occurring on a square lattice. We introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter mu, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential game organizers. For positive mu players with a high payoff will be considered more likely. Setting mu equal to zero returns the random selection of game organizers. We find that increasing the probability of selecting the wealthier individuals as game organizers can effectively promote cooperation. We show that the promotion of cooperation attributes to the dominance of the clusters of cooperative organizers in the population by investigating the evolution of spatial patterns.

Item Type: Article
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference: EPL (Europhysics Letters); 102(5):50006 (21 June 2013)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:48
Last Modified: 22 Aug 2016 14:49
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10368

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