Temporary bluffing can be rewarding in social systems: the case of romantic relationships

Rinaldi S, Landi P, & Della Rossa F (2015). Temporary bluffing can be rewarding in social systems: the case of romantic relationships. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 39 (3): 203-220. DOI:10.1080/0022250X.2015.1022280.

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Abstract

We show in this article that temporary bluffing has the power of promoting the transition from a bad to a good state in social systems. The analysis is carried out with reference to the simplest unit of interest in sociology - the couple - but it can be certainly extended to larger social groups. More precisely, an already available mathematical model shows that couples composed of so-called secure individuals with neither too high nor too low appeals have two alternative romantic regimes - one satisfactory and one not. Thus, if one of these couples is trapped in its unsatisfactory regime the problem is how to escape from that trap and switch to the satisfactory regime. Temporary bluffing, namely, giving to the partner for a sufficiently long time a biased impression of the involvement or of the appeal, is a very effective, though not unique, way for performing the switch. This, in a sense, attenuates the negative moral value usually given to bluffing in social behavior.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: differential equations; mathematical modeling; social groups
Research Programs: Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference: Journal of Mathematical Sociology; 39(3):203-220 (July 2015)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:53
Last Modified: 25 Apr 2017 08:45
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/11403

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