Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity

Nowak M & Sigmund K (1989). Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 137 (1): 21-26. DOI:10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80146-8.

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Abstract

A game-theoretical analysis of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma shows that the evolution of ensembles of stochastic strategies displays a dynamics of high complexity and unpredictability.

Item Type: Article
Research Programs: World Population (POP)
Depositing User: Romeo Molina
Date Deposited: 11 Apr 2016 12:25
Last Modified: 11 Apr 2016 12:25
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/12623

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