Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria

Kryazhimskiy AV & Sonnevend G (1996). Central Paths and Selection of Equilibria. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-96-039

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Abstract

For two populations of players playing repeatedly a same bimatrix game, a dynamics associated with the method of analytic centers for linear programming is described. All populations' evolutions converge to static equilibria. All evolutions starting in a same connected set converge to a same equilibrium. If a starting time is sufficiently large, "almost all" evolutions end up at a single equilibrium representing all populations' pure strategy groups (phenotypes) with nonzero proportions. The dynamics is interpreted as populations' rule to learn best replying.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Working Paper)
Research Programs: Dynamic Systems (DYN)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:08
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2016 06:41
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4987

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