Markets for tradeable emission and ambient permits: A dynamic approach

Ermoliev YM, Michalevich M, & Nentjes A (2000). Markets for tradeable emission and ambient permits: A dynamic approach. Environmental and Resource Economics 15 (1): 39-56. DOI:10.1023/A:100836961137.

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Abstract

This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollution permit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential, bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permits converges to a market equilibrium with minimal total costs of pollution control. If ambient or deposition permits are traded, the convergence of bilateral transactions occurs only in the case of a single receptor. For multiple receptors, the proof of convergence for tradeable emissions and ambient permits is given for two trade mechanisms: sequential, multilateral trade and a Walrasian auction.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bilateral and multilateral trade; Sequential; Tradeable emission and ambient permits; Walrasian auction
Research Programs: Risk, Modeling and Society (RMS)
Bibliographic Reference: Environmental and Resource Economics; 15(1):39-56 (January 2000)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:11
Last Modified: 23 Feb 2016 10:49
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5990

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