Lobbying and Campaigning with Applications to the Measure of Power

Young HP (1977). Lobbying and Campaigning with Applications to the Measure of Power. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-77-013

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Abstract

Two models are developed of the relative power of voters in a voting body, both based on the idea of lobbyists or interest groups creating a "market" for votes. In the first model, a single lobbyist attempts to put together a winning coalition at least cost, and the voters play an n-person game among themselves to determine who will be part of this coalition. Equilibrium prices for the voters result (unless there is a "veto player"); in fact, a novel and particularly strong equilibrium concept for the solution of this class of games obtains. The expected payoffs to the voters constitute one way of measuring their relative power, and the results are compared with traditional measures like the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index.

In the second model, two lobbyists are imagined to be in competition for votes. A 2-person game results, and the expected payoffs to the voters (if an equilibrium exists) can be said to constitute a measure of power in a competitive environment. Explicit solutions to the model are obtained when the opposing lobbyists are unevenly matched in terms of resources, and the results are applied to such diverse problems as Presidential campaigning for the U.S. Electoral College and the setting of legislators' salaries.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Research Report)
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 01:44
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2016 01:17
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/702

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