On the quality of compliance mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol

Nentjes A & Klaassen G (2004). On the quality of compliance mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. Energy Policy 32 (4): 531-544. DOI:10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00154-X.

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Abstract

In this paper we evaluate the compliance mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol as agreed at the seventh Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakech. We differ from the literature since we concentrate on the complete set of compliance rules agreed in Marrakech and, as a new element, we systematically discuss these compliance incentives in conjunction with the implicit compliance incentives: reputation protection, emission trading and banking. We conclude that effectiveness and efficiency go hand in hand for all explicit and implicit compliance incentives except one -- emission trading. Trading improves efficiency but this can also occur at the cost of increasing non-compliance.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Compliance; Kyoto protocol; efficiency
Research Programs: Transboundary Air Pollution (TAP)
Transboundary Air Pollution (TAP)
Bibliographic Reference: Energy Policy; 32(4):531-544 [2004]
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 02:16
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2016 11:34
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7098

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