International emission policy with lobbying and technological change

Palokangas T (2010). International emission policy with lobbying and technological change. In: Dynamic Systems, Economic Growth, and the Environment. Eds. Cuaresma, J. Crespo, Palokangas, T. & Tarasyev, A., Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-642-02131-2 DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-02132-9_8.

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Abstract

I examine emission policy in a union of countries when production in any country incurs emissions that pollute all over the union, but efficiency in production is improved by research and development (R&D). I compare four cases: Laissez-faire, Pareto optimal policy, and the case of a self-interested central planner that decides on nontraded or traded emission quotas. I show that with nontraded quotas, the growth rate is socially optimal, but welfare sub-optimal. Trade in quotas speeds up growth from the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down growth from the initial position of nontraded quotas.

Item Type: Book Section
Research Programs: Dynamic Systems (DYN)
Bibliographic Reference: In: J. Crespo Cuaresma, T. Palokangas, A. Tarasyev (eds); Dynamic Systems, Economic Growth, and the Environment; Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany pp.161-181
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Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 08:44
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2016 16:45
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/9350

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