Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., & Sigmund, K. (2015). Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Games and Economic Behavior 92 41-52. 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005.

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Abstract

Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.

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