The good, the bad and the discriminator - Errors in direct and indirect reciprocity

Brandt, H. & Sigmund, K. (2006). The good, the bad and the discriminator - Errors in direct and indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 239 (2) 183-194. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.045.

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Abstract

This paper presents, in a series of simple diagrams, concise results about the replicator dynamics of direct and indirect reciprocity. We consider repeated interactions between donors and recipients, and analyse the relationship between three basic strategies for the donor: unconditional cooperation, all-out defection, and conditional cooperation. In other words, we investigate the competition of discriminating and indiscriminating altruists with defectors. Discriminators and defectors form a bistable community, and hence a population of discriminators cannot be invaded by defectors. But unconditional altruists can invade a discriminating population and soften it up for a subsequent invasion by defectors. The resulting dynamics exhibits various forms of rock-paper-scissors cycles and depends in subtle ways on noise, in the form of errors in implementation. The probability for another round (in the case of direct reciprocity), and information about the co-player (in the case of indirect reciprocity), add further elements to the ecology of reciprocation.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Evolutionary game theory; Replicator dynamics; Cooperation; Reputation; Prisoner's Dilemma
Research Programs:	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
Bibliographic Reference:	Journal of Theoretical Biology; 239(2):183-194 (21 March 2006)
Depositing User:	IIASA Import
Date Deposited:	15 Jan 2016 02:19
Last Modified:	27 Aug 2021 17:19
URI:	https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7901

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