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Young, H.P. (1994). Social Justice and Individual Choice. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-94-025
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Abstract
Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to distributing dues among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different states or regions in a federal system of government.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | Institute Scholars (INS) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 02:04 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:14 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4184 |
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