Power, Prices, and Incomes in Voting Systems

Young, H.P. (1977). Power, Prices, and Incomes in Voting Systems. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-77-005

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For a lobbyist bribing a legislature, equilibrium prices for the legislators are shown to exist for any voting game without veto players. The resulting expected incomes of the legislators provide a new measure of their relative power.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Research Report)
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 01:44
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:08
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/710

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