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Young, H.P. (1978). A Tactical Lobbying Game. IIASA Research Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RR-78-010
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Abstract
Some basic solution properties and anomalies are investigated for a class of tactical games related to so-called Colonel Blotto games. In this model two agents compete for control of players in a given n-person simple game. It is shown that equilibrium solutions -- even in mixed strategies -- do not always exist. The case where the opponents have substantially unequal resources is solved and shown to attribute values to the players in the original n-person game that are in the least core. Some approximate values for particular cases where resources are equal are also cited.
| Item Type: | Monograph (IIASA Research Report) |
|---|---|
| Research Programs: | System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS) |
| Depositing User: | IIASA Import |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 01:44 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Aug 2021 17:08 |
| URI: | https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/833 |
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