Exploitable Surplus in n-Person Games

Young, H.P. (1978). Exploitable Surplus in n-Person Games. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-78-056

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Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sellout of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Working Paper)
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 01:44
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2021 17:08
URI: https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/860

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