Valuation of Games and Other Discrete Production Processes by Competitive Bidding

Young HP (1978). Valuation of Games and Other Discrete Production Processes by Competitive Bidding. IIASA Working Paper. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-78-057

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Abstract

The values of the players in an n-person cooperative game are analyzed by considering a simple auction model in which outside "entrepreneurs" bid to acquire control of the players. This bidding procedure always has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, thus yielding a concept of "market values" for the players. This class of values is easy to characterize and contains the core of the game. The model applies to various valuation problems (such as estate auctions, the setting of wage structures for laborers, or the valuation of divisions of a corporation) in which indivisible factors are present and there may be increasing returns to scale.

Item Type: Monograph (IIASA Working Paper)
Research Programs: System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
Depositing User: IIASA Import
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2016 01:44
Last Modified: 19 Jul 2016 09:10
URI: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/859

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